A material change of use: the rise and rise of the communitarian model by Hough, Barry
 A MATERIAL CHANGE OF USE:  THE RISE AND RISE OF THE
COMMUNITARIAN MODEL
Introduction
Few controversies can have such a profound significance for the planning
system than that surrounding the meaning of "development".  Each limb of
"development" in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s.55 has its
interpretational complexities.1  Profound questions continue to surround the
meaning of the second limb of Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s.55  that
triggers planning powers where there has been a material change of use of
land.2    In particular, difficulty surrounds the meaning of the word "material".
The established principle that a material change is simply a question of fact and
degree3 camouflages, and does not resolve, the kernel of the debate because it
disguises the range of evidence or material facts that influence the outcome.
The dilemma concerns the extent to which   a material change of use can be
identified by reference to the external consequences of the proposed change
rather than the extent or degree of the change within the planning unit.  Recent
case law undoubtedly reveals a judicial willingness to regard off-site harm as a
material consideration but it will be argued that the case law reveals a range of
issues not all of which should be treated alike.  It will be suggested that some
presently acknowledged versions of off-site "harm" should be disregarded in
establishing whether a material change is use exists.
The task of the courts in establishing the meaning of a "material" change of use
is complicated because of the absence of an unambiguous legislatively
articulated function for planning law.4  In essence the choice is  between either
the communitarian or private property  models. The first of these, which
                                                          
1  This article is primarily concerned with the second limb of s.55.  The boundary between
developmental and non developmental activity is also problematic in relation to the first limb of this
section: see e.g., Skerritts of Nottingham v. Secretary of State [2000] JPL 281 QBD and [2000] JPL
1050 CA; Barvis Ltd v. Secretary of State  (1971) 22 P & CR 710;   Cheshire County Council v.
Woodward [1962] 2 QB 126.
2  Development  means "the carrying out of building operations, engineering operations, mining
operations or other operations in, over or under land or the making of any material change of use of any
buildings or other land (emphasis supplied).
3 E.g., Howell v. Sunbury-on-Thames (1964) 62 LGR 119; Blackpool BC v. Secretary of State [1980]
JPL 527; Panayi v. Secretary of State (1985)  50  P & CR 109.
4  See e.g., P. Morgan and S. Nott, Development Control, Law Policy and Practice,  Butterworths, (2nd
edit: 1995) pp. 3-5.
2includes various versions of utilitarianism,  takes a positive approach
according to which the general welfare can best be realised where decision
makers are entrusted with broad powers to regulate land use  largely unfettered
by the selfish interests of individual landowners.5  The second asserts that  there
is a minimum content to individual liberty beyond majoritarian and, indeed,
expert or technocratic preferences.  It is a  model  that regards the planning
jurisdiction as a  limited body of law committed to the minimum interference
with private property rights consistent with achieving its fundamental aims.
Communitarianism
A  technocratic version of communitarianism would permit expert decision
makers a relatively wide remit to override private preferences for the sake of
the general welfare that the expert has identified.  In other words it would allow
planning authorities to exercise power to achieve general welfare interests
provided that, in the absence of their intervention harm would result,6 or a
public benefit not secured.  It would accept that competition between actual
land uses  and/or claims to use land leads to friction unless resolved by the
state.  This is a version of positive liberty that accepts state action as a
concomitant of social living and it further asserts that the state is better
equipped to identify the common good than those selfishly interested in
advancing their own private goals.  The community interest should  be
identified by trained administrators who can identify the common good from
concrete factual settings.7   According to this  model, planning would proceed
by scientific means, which would necessarily reject the view that any
perception of harm is a material consideration.8  Unless neighbours could
establish objectively that harm had been sustained the development to which
they objected would proceed (all other considerations being equal9).   This
model would insist that each 'intrusion'  into private choice be explained and
justified by an objective evaluation  of the overriding general welfare rather
                                                          
5  See e.g., P. MacAuslan, "The Ideologies of Planning Law" (1980).  The private property ideology
can be identified in the writings of John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Blackwell 1956.
6  The concept of  harm is a difficult one which is discussed below.
7  This requires us to accept that a common welfare exists and that planning law is not actually about
mediating between rival vested interests.
8    As we shall see the law adopts a wider view such that perceptions of harm may now be material
considerations: R v. Tandridge DC ex p Mohammed Al Fayed [2000] JPL 604; Newport Borough
Council v. Secretary of State  for Wales and Browning Ferris Environmental Services Ltd [1998] JPL
377.
9  For example, the requirements of the development plan: s.54A of the Town and Country Planning
Act 1990.
3than arbitrary and shifting public sentiment.  The recent decision in  Richmond-
upon-Thames LBC v. Secretary of State,10 discussed below, is located very
much within this model.
Within the broader communitarian ideology can be located various versions of
utilitarianism.11  In its basic or 'unrestricted' form it requires  the administrator
to reach a decision from all the available options that will produce the greatest
sum of happiness for all.  Its emphasis is on process and in its basic form
accords with the view that each preference is entitled to enter the utilitarian
balance.  As between scientifically supported and other objections in the
planning process it is neutral since each preference must receive equal weight.
This strand of   utilitarianism supports the view that a material consideration in
planning should include non-scientific objections to unpopular development12
but rejects the view that the administrator can ascribe different values to these
admissible, non-objective, considerations.13
The Private Property Model
The project of the private property model seeks to limit potential over-reach of
planning controls by reference to a version of negative liberty according to
which each individual, in the absence of some overriding public interest, should
be free to advance their own happiness. It would reject the
communitarian/utilitarian view under which the individual is subordinated since
it argues that some values are fundamentally important and should be placed
beyond majoritarian controls.  It expresses the need each of us has an individual
not  to suffer any but minimal interference in individual choices.  A thriving,
vibrant and satisfying society must acknowledge a minimum content of
individual liberty. It also challenges the communitarians to justify prioritising
the interests of the many to maximise their enjoyment of property over the
misery of the few who cannot enjoy theirs. How can you compare (in a case
like Gladden14) the claim of the neighbour to be free of a view of a replica
                                                          
10  [2000] 2 PLR 115, High Court, Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC sitting as  Deputy Judge.
11  There are, alternatively, act or rule versions of utilitarianism.  In its unrestricted form act
utilitarianism holds that an act is right if it produces a greater amount of happiness than any possible
alternative.  In its pure form rule utilitarianism holds that an act must conform to a recognised and
accepted rule which itself produces more happiness than any alternative: D Miller, Social Justice,
Clarendon Press 1975, pp. 33  et seq.
12  See note 8 above. These issues are developed below.
13  Contrast Tesco Stores v. Secretary of State [1995] 2 All ER 636.
14 [1994] JPL 723, discussed below.
4aircraft with the claim of the occupier to enjoy the presence of the same object?
If all are free and equal why should one view exclude the other?  This model
would influence the boundaries of "development" by placing a greater emphasis
upon  the freedom of the individual to make changes in use  of land, and would
thus insist on a higher development threshold in s.55 than the communitarian or
utilitarian approaches.
Off-site Harm in Planning Decisions
The trend in the recent case-law is to allow planning considerations that would
be relevant at the merits stage (the decision whether or not to grant planning
permission) to influence whether a change of use is a material change of use
and so subject to the need to seek planning approval.15  This can be described as
an approach that allows "off-site harm" or the consequences of possible
development to influence the question whether development has taken place.  It
will be argued below that this general  approach disguises a number of distinct
issues, and that a refinement of the present approach is required.   This is so
because the cases raise different issues one from another and require a more
sophisticated conceptualisation if planning law is not to stray beyond its proper
purposes. In particular, it will be argued that the notion of a material or
planning consideration is so wide, (embracing as it appears to do any thing
relevant to the use of land; it need not be confined to questions of amenity or
environmental impact16) that the unlimited assimilation of such open-ended
factors into  the question whether development has occurred threatens a radical
and probably unacceptable extension of the planning system. If, in principle, a
material consideration can mean anything connected with  land use  there can
be few changes in the use of land that planning law cannot regulate.17  This
extreme communitarian stance  will subject many activities, including those
                                                          
15 See  e.g.  Panayi v. Secretary of state for the Environment  (1985)  50  P & CR 109; Lilo Blum v.   
Secretary of State for the Environment and Richmond upon Thames LBC [1987] JPL 278;  Forest of
Dean District Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment & Howells  [1995] JPL 937;  Thames
Heliport v. Tower Hamlets LBC  [1997] JPL 448 and Richmond-upon-Thames LBC v. Secretary of
State, March 28th 2000, above n.10.
16  E.g.,  Esdell Caravan Parks v. Hemel Hempstead RDC [1965] 1 QB 895; Clyde & Co. v. Secretary
of State for the Environment [1977] 1 WLR 926; Westminster CC v. Great Portland Estates  [1985] 1
AC 661; Mitchell v. Secretary of State and Kensington and Chelsea Royal Borough [1994] JPL 363.
17  This is a concern arising from Wallington v. Secretary of State for Wales  (1990) 62 P & CR 150
in which a significant increase in the number of dogs kept as pets within a dwelling house was held to
be development. See B. Hough, Planning Law and Domestic Privacy [1992] Journal of Planning and
Environmental Law  906.
5within the privacy of the home, to majoritarian rather than private choices.18  It
seems to reject the view that some areas of life are so important that they should
be placed beyond arbitrary public sentiment and protected by law unless an
overwhelming public interest to the contrary can be identified (unless that
public interest is triggered by almost every change in the use of land).
Off-site Harm
The decision  of Simon Brown J. in   Lilo Blum v.   Secretary of State for the
Environment and Richmond upon Thames LBC 19  presents the first potential
difficulty where considerations that would inform the merits question (whether
approval be granted) infiltrate the prior question (is there development?) The
facts in this case were that an enforcement notice had been served  alleging that
a material change of use had occurred when livery stables were additionally
used as a riding school. At first sight the change did not seem to be a very
significant one:  the former livery stables had involved the activity of horse
riding as well as that of sheltering horses.  The subsequent riding school
undertook similar activities, but these also involved  an increase in the riding.
The enforcement notice was broadly upheld by the Inspector on appeal and
subsequently by the High Court. Here Simon Brown J., holding that
development had occurred,  considered that its key  constituent was the increase
in  horse traffic  along  bridle ways in a conservation area (an issue that the
Inspector had also identified as the main issue relevant to the planning merits to
be considered on the deemed application for permission).  This increased use of
the bridle ways was likely to damage them.  This revealed  the central dilemma:
the considerations that would properly impinge on planning merits (whether
permission should be granted) also determined whether there was development
in the first place; the threshold had all but vanished.
But that did not conclude the issue because the concern with maintaining the
state of the paths arguably poses questions about overlapping or parallel
jurisdictions of the planning and highway authorities respectively.  This is
considered further below.
But this does not conclude the matter because there are different kinds of off-
site harm. The redress of some of these harms does seems compelling. This is
                                                          
18  Ibid.
19  [1987] JPL 278.
6so, for example, in Richmond-upon-Thames LBC v. Secretary of State which is
a further example of the communitarian model albeit that, in addressing "off-
site harm", it raises different issues from those in Lilo Blum. Here the question
was whether the conversion of a dwelling house containing seven self-
contained flats to one large  family house would constitute a material change of
use notwithstanding the almost complete absence of external alteration and a
reduction in the "nuisance" effects associated with multiple occupancy (such as
the number of visitors to the building).     The local planning authority wished
to resist the change because it conflicted with the established policy objective
of avoiding any reduction in the stock of low cost small accommodation.
In following Panayi v. Secretary of State20  Christopher Lockhart-Mummery
QC determined that the reduction in accommodation would entail a material
change of use requiring planning permission.  This was so because if a change
of use gave rise to planning considerations, such as the loss of a particular type
of residential accommodation, that would be a relevant factor to be taken into
account in considering whether the change of use is a material change of use.
His lordship also stated that it was "common ground" between the parties that
the loss of residential accommodation would be a material factor at the merits
stage under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s.70 (2).  This confirms the
importance of merits issues in establishing whether development has occurred.
His lordship also emphasised that if the opposite conclusion were reached, the
important social and economic policy of increasing the number of low cost
properties available would be "profoundly" affected if developers could
amalgamate these small units into larger ones without acquiring planning
consent. Thus  development occurred because of the public interest in
preserving the flats; the materiality of the change was not concerned with the
degree of change of the building  but its importance in terms of the public
interest. But it is to be emphasised that the harmful consequences that  the
decision sought to avoid were consequences for public policy in the potential
reduction in small residential units. Richmond is thus an exemplar par
excellence of the communitarian interpretation of the development concept.
Yet other issues arise where there is a conflict between persons seeking to
exercise their own liberty. Here the "consequences" test is used as a means of
choosing between these rival land uses.  In Wallington v. Secretary of State  for
                                                          
20  (1985)  50  P & CR 109.
7Wales21   the keeping of a large number of dogs was held to be a material
change of use of land falling outside the saving for uses incidental to the
enjoyment of a dwelling house as such.22   The probable sub silentio reasoning
was that the dogs caused off-site harm to a nearby property,  although the  ex
facie reasons were alternatively that a material change of use occurred by virtue
of the displacement of conventional dwelling house activities, and thus
furnished evidence of the degree of change; alternatively that   such an eccentric
hobby fell outside the exemption as it was not incidental to the enjoyment of
the dwellinghouse as such.  Similarly, in Croydon LBC v. Gladden23  the basis
for the decision must have been that the placing of a replica aircraft in the
garden of a small suburban property would cause detriment in the
neighbourhood. The only purpose in which an unconventional land use such as
this might be thought to merit planning control is that it is perceived as harmful
to others.  The issue that needs to be resolved is the sense in which this so?
What kind of harm is this?  This issue becomes even more acute when it is
recalled that the reasoning in Gladden was that  the introduction  of other large
objects onto the land (in contrast to the replica Spitfire) would not raise a
planning question.  This is an issue to which we shall return.
Measuring the Importance of Change: the Problem of 'Harm'
It has been shown that whether development has occurred is often determined
by reference to the likelihood that it might cause harmful consequences for
others beyond the boundaries of the planning unit.   The resolution of border-
line cases by reference to off-site consequences, or off site 'harm', if now
judicially accepted in principle, poses a number of complex issues. The first of
these touches on the meaning of harm.  This is particularly so in relation to
some cases of unconventional land use, but it is not confined to these cases.
What is cognisable as 'harm' in the planning context? Does legally cognisable
harm mean that which can be scientifically or empirically shown to exist or is
the perception of harm sufficient?  Does harm occur where it frustrates aims
perceived as important to an individual's chosen way of life? Or does it require
                                                          
21   (1990) 62 P & CR 150.
22  Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s.55 (2)(d).
23    [1994] JPL 723.
8injury or potential threat to an entitlement or interest?24 What degree of harm
justifies interference in private choice?  Is proof of any harm sufficient?
The Meaning of 'Harm'
The concept of harm is a notoriously difficult one not least because an activity
that may harm one individual may profit another. Further, an affliction normally
understood as harmful may, in individual cases, produce benefits.25 Harm may
also have different meanings for different social groups.26 And the law does not
treat equally claims to be free from harm.27
Two alternative conceptions of harm must be considered.  According to the
first, (model 1) harm cannot be understood independently of some consensus
about how individuals in society ought to live and the kind of satisfaction they
are entitled to enjoy.  The second (model 2) adopts a more subjective approach
and argues that harm occurs wherever there is an actual or threatened
interference with an  activity considered to be important by an individual to his
or her way of life.    
Judicial cognisance of harm in the planning context has recently altered
significantly. There is an emerging orthodoxy that harm means "genuinely
perceived" rather than  "actual" (or even "significant") harm, and that the
decision-maker has a duty to take into account the  perception of harm (or
individual preference) as a material consideration.28   Accordingly,  the recent
case-law ostensibly appears to accept model 2 discussed above. In fact, it is
even wider than this because proof of "actual or threatened" interference is
unnecessary: an unsupported affirmation that harm may result is treated as a
                                                          
24  By 'interest' it is meant a right or expectation for which the law or administration devises means of
protection independently of an extension to the planning system.
25  A philosopher who suffered blindness in old age refused to concede that harm had befallen him.
Whilst normally sighted, he argued that he had dissipated his energies; once blind he would concentrate
more fruitfully on his philosophy: a story told of the philosopher Brentano cited in D. Z.  Phillips and
H. O. Mounce, On Morality's Having a Point, Philosophy, xl (1965) p. 316.
26  For a valuable general discussion of risk and  harm see  N. Stanley, Public Concern: the Decision-
Makers' Dilemma [1998] JPL 919 to which the present author is much indebted.
27  Hence the dictum that "..what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square  would not necessarily be so
in Bermondsey..", Thesiger LJ delivering the judgment of the CA in Sturges v. Bridgman (1879) 11
Ch.D. 852 at p. 865.
28  Although the weight to be attached to that factor is for the decision maker, acting reasonably, to
determine.  See e.g., on this issue and that of the subjective meaning of harm, R v. Tandridge DC ex p
Mohammed Al Fayed [2000] JPL 604; Newport Borough Council v. Secretary of State  for Wales and
Browning Ferris Environmental Services Ltd [1998] JPL 377 CA; Gateshead MBC v. Secretary of
State  [1994] 1 All ER 397.
9material consideration;  scientific evidence of this is not necessarily required.
This means, of course, that perceived harm, often amounting to little more than
disapproval, is given a de jure recognition.  In cases of a conflict  between the
claim of an individual to change, in a minor way, the use of his land and the
objections of neighbours who see themselves as harmed by the proposed
activity it culminates in an  extreme communitarian position akin to that which
R. Dworkin describes as "neutral utilitarianism".29  This theory  asserts that the
existence of 'more or more intense desire' justifies the denial of the fulfilment
of an individual's desires. The law thus avoids confronting the disapproving
neighbours'  needs30 and instead focuses on weighing "desire".
 A contrast with the technocratic version of communitarianism is also suggested
by the emerging orthodoxy.  Technocratic communitarianism would permit the
decision maker to recognise and be influenced only by harm in the first sense
identified above; in other words, the accountable decision maker is entitled to
make judgments about the kind of satisfaction individuals are entitled to enjoy
and to assess scientifically whether those expectations will be frustrated.   The
broader neutral or unrestricted utilitarian stance reduces the influence of
experts; scientifically justified  notions of harm are placed on the same level as
irrational perceptions of harm.
The current approach can readily be seen to have the potential for significantly
expanding  the reach of planning law.  Landowners who make some minor
change in the use of land may find themselves subject to planning jurisdiction
because of a neighbour's perception that he or she has suffered harm.
Development for the purposes of s.55 can thus be triggered where such "harm"
occurs, yet this perception may amount to little more than disapproval. The
existence of more or more intense desire may thus outweigh the choice made by
an adjacent landowner.   The potential for difficulties in this respect can be seen
in   Newport Borough Council v. Secretary of State for Wales and Browning
Ferris Environmental Services Ltd 31  where it was held to be lawful to refuse
planning permission for a  waste treatment plant in the face of local objections
founded (erroneously) on anxieties concerning public safety.  As is well know
the Court of Appeal decided that  such anxieties were a material consideration
and that it was an error of law to hold that the genuine fears on the part of the
                                                          
29    R Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in J Waldron, Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press, 1984.
30   "Need" describes and  gives priority to those desires or preferences which, if not satisfied, result in
harm or the denial of some interest:   B. Barry, Political  Argument, 1965,  re-issued 1990, p.lxviii.
31 [1998] JPL 377.
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public, unless objectively justified, could never amount to a valid ground for
refusal.32  This means, of course, that mere perceptions of possible harm can be
overriding in the planning process. 33
The emphasis upon an unrestricted utilitarian calculus may also jeopardise
certain unconventional land uses. This concern arises from the reasoning in
Croydon LBC v. Gladden.34   This ventured the possibility that it might be
acceptable in planning terms to place a pirate's ship, a wendy house or an
unconventional statue in the rear garden of a dwelling house, but not another
unconventional  large object (such as in this case, the replica aircraft).35 Since
the replica aircraft (development) and the unconventional statue (non
development) are each inert, in the sense that they emit no noise, smoke or
odour, the basis for the distinction must be that one is more likely to incur the
disapproval of neighbours than the other.   It may be questioned whether
planning law should articulate in these terms a preference between one large
object and another. Decisions such as this suggest that even where alternative
land uses do not result in nuisance some are more equal than others.
From the private, albeit selfish, perspective of the landowner the possibilities of
unrestricted utilitarianism threaten an imposition of majoritarian preferences in
private matters of taste.
Thus the dilemma for the judiciary in cases raising such divergent issues like
Lilo Blum, Richmond,  Wallington and Gladden is  to provide a more
                                                          
32  There is, however, a conflict as to whether such perceptions of harm, without more, justify a refusal
of planning permission.  Compare, for example, Newport Borough Council v. Secretary of State  for
Wales and Browning Ferris Environmental Services Ltd [1998] JPL 377 CA; Gateshead MBC v.
Secretary of State  [1994] 1 All ER 397.
33  In cases where off-site consequences will be examined to decide whether a material change of use
has occurred it means that the jurisdiction of the planning authority depends on the reaction (or lack of
reaction)  of neighbours!
34  [1994] JPL 723.  The court in this case considered whether a private residential occupier would
have the freedom to place a replica Spitfire aircraft in either the front or rear garden of their suburban
residential property.  The court held that such an use was not incidental to the enjoyment of a dwelling
house as such (the exemption in s.55 (2) (d) of the 1990 Act) but their lordships gave different reasons
for this.  According to Dillon LJ the exemption only benefited objectively reasonable land uses.  Stuart-
Smith LJ offered the more liberal view that even unconventional or unusual or large objects could, as a
matter of fact and degree, benefit from the exemption, but held that the aircraft did not do so because it
would be placed on the land to "tease" the local authority and not for bona fide enjoyment purposes.
Hobhouse LJ agreed with both judgments. Emin v. Secretary of State [1989] JPL 909  seems consistent
with the liberal approach preferred by Stuart-Smith LJ.
35   per Stuart Smith LJ at p. 733.  Presumably the replica lacked an engine.  Had it been otherwise, and
the complaints had been founded on noise nuisance, the case would have  been a more straightforward
one,  since even proponents of the private property model would accept that no-one would be at liberty
to inflict such harm on neighbours.
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convincing justification and explanation of the role of the state in restricting
private choice than an unqualified resort to off-site harm.   It suggests a need
for a more sharply focused principle than  one which uncritically accepts any
version of "off-site harm" as a planning consideration, especially where this
amounts to perceived rather than actual harm. And it may be appropriate that, in
the planning context, harm should not be identified independently of an
understanding of entitlements.  At this point it is necessary to consider how any
debate concerning  entitlements may be  influenced by the bringing into force
of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Human Rights 36
The enactment, in the Human Rights Act 1998, of "convention rights" has
received into English law most of the substantive provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Convention guarantees are, of course, binding
against public authorities such as planning authorities, unless the statute itself
requires a result contrary to a convention right.37
Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees respect for
private and family life.38  "Private life means the sphere of each individual life
into which non-one can intrude without having been asked.  Freedom of private
life is the recognition to everyone's benefit, of a zone of activity which is  one's
own, and whose entry one is free to prohibit to anyone." 39  The article
embraces a right to free enjoyment of the "home", the meaning of which
appears to be widely defined.40
                                                          
36  For a general discussion see, e.g.,   Upton,  The European Convention on Human Rights and
Environmental Law,  [1998] JPL 315; Corner,  Planning, Environment and the ECHR [1998] JPL 301;
Hart, The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on Planning and Environmental Law [2000] JPL 117.
37  Human Rights Act 1998, s.6
38 The basic right in Article 8 (1) is that "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence."  The right is qualified by article 8 (2) which states in effect that
interference with this right is lawful if it is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of (inter alia)  the economic well-being of the country and the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. Art 1 of Protocol 1 should also be noted.  It  confers an entitlement to the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions.  Interference with the basic right is permitted "in the public interest
and subject to conditions provided for by the law".
39  From   Les Libertés Publiques, vol. 2,  Jean Rivero,  Presse Universitaire de France, 1989 p. 76.
40  Including, for example, a businessman's office: Niemietz v. Germany 16 EHRR 97; and a gypsy
caravan: Buckley v. UK [1996] JPL 1018. A minority group can also claim the right to respect for its
particular life-style as "private life", "family life" or "home": Application Nos. 9278 and 9415/81 v.
Norway (1984) 6 EHRR 357
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The existence of planning controls is recognised as necessary in a democratic
society and thus capable of being exercised in a manner consistent with
Convention guarantees.41 However, as we shall see below, the Convention
seems  to insist on a greater emphasis than domestic law  on the claims of the
individual user of land. This probably follows  a fortiori in the context of
activities within the curtilage of  dwelling house.
In essence Art 8 (1) and (2) requires the state to have regard "..to the fair
balance  that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and
the interest of individuals, the search for which balance is inherent in the whole
Convention".42  This can be seen in a case in which  national authorities
planned  the partial flooding of a valley for hydro-electric purposes within an
area inhabited by a nomadic minority group.43  The Commission acknowledged
that the scheme would interfere with the life style of the group, and hence their
private lives, but the interference was justified under Art 8 (2) because the
national authorities had given careful consideration to the interest of the Lapps
as well as to the national economic interest. The weight attached to the  Lapps'
concerns and the careful balancing exercise by the national authorities ensured
that a breach of Art. 8 did not occur.
Where interference in private life by the state does occur it must be 'necessary';
and this connotes a  'pressing social need' for the interference in question. As
Howard v. UK44 reveals, an urgent need to regenerate land can justify
compulsory purchase,  although a critical reason for the lawfulness of the state
action  in this case was that the inspector had recognised and given full weight
to the interests of the elderly residents whose land was affected.
Each state has a "margin of appreciation" in determining whether a  pressing
social need exists. The purpose of the margin of appreciation is to allow
national decision makers, subject to review by the Strasbourg Court, some
scope to identify relevant  social conditions within their own state, that the
                                                          
41  See e.g., Masefield v. UK (1987) 9 EHRR 136.
42  Cossey v. UK (1990) 13 EHRR 622; see also Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994) 20 EHRR 277 .
43  Application Nos. 9278 and 9415/81 v. Norway (1984) 6 EHRR 357.
44  (1988) 52 DR 198. This admissibility decision was primarily concerned with the issue of effective
redress under art 13, although a complaint under Art 8 had been declared unsuccessful at an  earlier
stage.
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court would be less well-equipped to recognise. 45  In the planning context, it is
acknowledged that a wide margin of appreciation is applied.46
The doctrine of proportionality restricts the margin of appreciation so that scale
of actual interference  must be judged  against the importance of the legitimate
aim pursued.47  A complete ban on the enjoyment of an activity will require
more serious reasons to justify it than a less intrusive interference. But state
action taken to further important social policy attracts both a wide margin of
appreciation and imposes a correspondingly low burden of proportionality.48
It is recognised that proportionate action may be taken by state authorities to
preserve a  landscape of particular aesthetic or natural value even if this does
amount to a ban on the exercise of private legal rights. For example the
"general interest" justified an interference with the  right to peaceful enjoyment
of a possession, such as a war time bunker converted into a seasonal dwelling
house,  because the restrictions were "desirable and necessary" to prevent harm
in an area of outstanding natural beauty.49
Complainants who suffer grave inconvenience50 short of personal injury have
not been held to have suffered a violation of their Art 8 right where  the state
was pursuing a legitimate and important aim (urban regeneration) because the
state action, within the permitted margin of appreciation, "fairly" balanced their
interests with those of the community.51  This is important because it signals
that even serious harm will not render unlawful state action that pursues a
legitimate purpose.  A fortiori mere perceptions of harm would not appear to
                                                          
45  Dudgeon v. UK (1981) 4 EHRR 149.
46  See e.g., ISKCON v. UK (1994) 22 EHRR 7 CD 133.
47  Handyside v. UK (1976)1 EHRR 737.
48  See Mellacher v. Austria (1990) 12 EHRR 391, where the state, in reforming the rental housing
market did not violate art 1. of Protocol 1 when it introduced statutory powers resulting in the reduction
in a freely negotiated rent to a mere 17.6 % of its value.
49  Application No. 11185/84 Herrick v. UK (1986) 8 EHRR 66.  This complaint also raised issues
under both Art 1 of protocol 1 as well as Art 8.  As far as the latter was concerned the enforcement
action was for a legitimate aim, proportionate, and intended to protect the rights of others.  The
Commission observed that a more stringent test for  assessing the legitimacy of the aim to be pursued
applied under Art 8 than under art 1 of protocol 1, although the proportionality test was substantially
similar.  Similarly, in Application No. 11469/85 Mansfield v. UK (1987) 9 EHRR 136. On the
importance of landscape, such as the Green Belt,  see Buckley v. UK [1996] JPL 1018.
50  Evidence established that for a period of around three years residents of a London neighbourhood
were unable to open their windows or dry washing out of doors because of dust pollution caused by
road building.
51  Khatun v. UK (1996) 26 EHRR CD 212
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weigh heavily in the balance and thus would be most unlikely to outweigh state
action that pursued a legitimate aim.52
 In sum, the Art 8 cases reveal that public authorities act consistently with the
Convention when individual interests are  given careful consideration and only
overridden where a clear countervailing public interest can be identified, such
as the need to protect the general economic interest or the rights of others. Even
then the authority must strike a fair balance  between the competing interests.
As Corner concludes53 the application of the Convention will require a greater
emphasis on the individual interest than has been traditional in domestic
planning and this may signal a re-appraisal of the communitarian model to
reflect that emphasis.
Suggested Reform
If it is now an emerging principle that off-site harm  is capable of establishing a
material change of use it should perhaps be recognised that the various kinds of
off-site harm raise different issues and the principles under which such harm
influences the decision-making process ought to be refined to reflect this.   The
following argues that cases  should be distinguished according to the categories
suggested below:
Category 1 "ulterior purpose"
The first category is concerned with cases in which the local authority
identifies certain off-site harm as relevant to planning but this harm might
alternatively be addressed under another "parallel" statutory scheme. Blum
arguably represented such a case because the decision to employ development
control to preserve the condition of the public paths by minimising the
opportunity of the public to exercise their rights over them  caused two
principle concerns.  First it sought to divert the public (or interested horse-
riders) from the enjoyment of a vested public right; and second it arrogated to
the planning authority a decision over highway management that might
alternatively lie with the highway authority.  Other management techniques,
                                                          
52   This raises the possibility that the grant of planning permission for the waste treatment plant in
Newport Borough Council v. Secretary of State  for Wales and Browning Ferris Environmental
Services Ltd [1998] JPL 377 could not have been impugned by neighbours as a violation of Art 8 on the
grounds of unsubstantiated health concerns.
53  Planning, Environment and the ECHR [1998] JPL 301, 312.
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such as maintenance and repair,  were undoubtedly alternatives to the chosen
indirect method of exclusion that the highway authority may have considered as
alternatives.   The intervention of planning denied that authority, and the public,
this possibility.
In some, but not all, cases of this kind the exercise of planning powers may be
lawful as falling within statutory authority,54 but even where this is so the
existence of  possible action under the alternative jurisdiction might be
regarded as a relevant consideration that the planning authority could only
decline to follow on rational grounds.  Where the off site harm identified is
harm that properly falls within the  jurisdiction of a body other than the local
planning authority, 55 it is not normally relevant  to  planning.
Category 2- Parallel Jurisdiction
In cases in which there is a legitimate 'parallel' jurisdiction the issues will be
different from those in category 1.  For example, if the local planning authority
had to determine whether a change of use was material and called in aid the
possibility of off-site harm, such as noise, the existence of the noise abatement
remedies would be a relevant planning consideration.56   The availability of  a
satisfactory  remedy outside planning influences the merits issue so as to allow
a local planning authority to permit development, thereby acknowledging the
role of environmental health officials.  This limits the role of planning as a
preventative system, although the extent to which this is so is unclear.57
It is, however, possible to argue that the possible existence of a parallel
jurisdiction should also be relevant to the manner in which off-site harm is now
considered at the threshold stage. In essence the argument is that  if adverse
                                                          
54  Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s.335 which allows planning authorities to exercise planning
powers notwithstanding the existence of a "parallel" and specific  power  provided that the latter was
enacted and in force at the passing of the 1947 Act.
55  For example, where the enactment was not in force at the passing of the 1947 Act. (But see on this
point Westminster Bank v. Beverely BC [1971] AC 509)
56   E.g., controls under part III of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 which might involve
consultation between planning and environmental health officers. Gateshead  Metropolitan Borough
Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment & Northumbria Water Group plc    [1995] JPL 432
decided that the parallel regime is a material consideration in deciding whether to grant or refuse
planning permission. See also PPG 23.
57  Development might be refused where harm might otherwise result notwithstanding integrated
pollution control, but here again the Newport case raises questions about the meaning  of harm: see
Professor M Purdue, The Relationship between Development Control and Specialist Pollution Controls
etc., [1999]  JPL 585.
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planning consequences can determine whether there has been a material change
of use, removal of those adverse consequences by other, possibly statutory,
means ipso facto undermines the case that a material change of use has
occurred.  For example, in a case involving noise (depending on the severity of
the harm) if  a material change of use would only arise under the consequences
test the existence of noise pollution controls might permit the local planning
authority to consider whether the prima facie development had not actually
occurred because the harm could be addressed by other means.
Further, the emphasis on proportionality in human rights law would suggest
that, in some cases, an activity should not be restrained where  the state could
achieve its legitimate aim of protecting the interests of others by allowing  the
activity to proceed  subject to the use of other remedies to remove any harmful
consequences.   The effectiveness of the alternative remedy  would thus be a
relevant consideration.
Category 3 - harm and entitlement
In category 3 no question of ulterior purpose or parallel jurisdiction arises.  It
describes other cases in which the planning authority wishes to intervene in
order to address identified off-site harm not falling within categories 1, 2 or 4.
In particular, it is concerned with those cases that the state needs to resolve a
conflict between individuals seeking to exercise their own liberty as, for
example, in Gladden, and Wallington.58   It raises again the question of the
meaning of 'harm'.
As we have seen, unsubstantiated objections to a possible development on the
grounds it might cause harm are currently admissible as "material
considerations".  Newport reveals that these views are not only taken into
account and weighed as relevant but they can also be overriding.   This, as it
has been argued, is consistent with a utilitarian stance that allows a public
representative to decide a planning issue so as to advance the sum of communal
happiness.  All preferences count and count equally.  The merits of this
inclusive approach to materiality are that a decision that is adverse to the
objectors' wishes is made more acceptable if they are aware that their views
                                                          
58  Also Forest of Dean District Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment & Howells  [1995]
JPL 937.
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have been taken into account.  It also encourages the widest participation in the
planning process since anyone who perceives themselves affected must be
heard. As the Newport case demonstrates, this approach also dilutes the
influence of scientific evidence in planning, and thereby acknowledges possible
public disquiet about scientific reassurances.  Thus there are strong arguments
that views of neighbours or objectors should be planning considerations.59  The
difficulty is to determine the influence these should have in the planning
process, especially where other countervailing considerations are also relevant.
This returns us to the vexed issues of preferences and  'harm'.
It can be argued that the present adoption of unrestricted utilitarianism is open
to objection because the satisfaction of some wants may be judged to be
without any value; they may actually be harmful and thus ought to be left out of
consideration in choosing between possible options.  The frustration of certain
preferences can thus be recognised as a benefit. It could be argued, for
example,  that a desire shared by the majority of the community that the
minority suffer a disadvantage or receive less because of their colour would not
be acceptable.  Similarly, the strong desire of a village community that a new
neighbour send their child to the village school threatened with closure rather
than to a distant private school  could also not be supported without
undermining notions of liberty.    The claims of the community do not become
persuasive simply because they perceive themselves to be harmed by the choice
of school.
This suggests that the decision maker should be concerned with a just
distribution of satisfaction that would acknowledge the right of individuals to
be treated equally.  An individual should be able to pursue liberty unless harm
is thereby caused to others.  If decision makers were concerned with just
distribution it would suggest the application of a version of harm  similar to that
propounded as model 1 above. In other words, harm  should not be understood
independently of some consensus about the kinds of satisfaction individuals are
entitled to enjoy.  This may demand that each person's ranking of the
importance of having their respective wants satisfied is not necessarily adopted
by the political decision maker.60    Subjective perceptions of harm are thus
                                                          
59    The need to advertise applications for planning permission under the Town and Country Planning
Act 1990, s.71 (as amended) and Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order
1995/419 recognises the importance of  local views as part of the planning process.
60  See B. Barry, Political  Argument, 1965,  re-issued 1990, esp.  pp. 38 et seq.
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capable of being differentiated in law from, say, empirically verifiable harm or
simply undeserving  claims.
The need for such a reform is arguably made necessary by the incorporation
into English law of Convention Rights.   Unlike the utilitarian calculus in which
more or more intense desire prevails, the emphasis for the Convention is the
"fairness" of the balance. It suggests that whilst each objector is entitled to be
heard on what is necessary to satisfy their own conditions for happiness, even if
shared with the majority of others,  their claims do not necessarily correspond
with either a just distribution of satisfaction or one which meets the demands of
an alternative public interest that an expert might identify.
If this is accepted, the present concept of materiality  (in so far as it applies to
development in s.55) should  be reformed.  The disapproval of others,
unsupported by empirically identifable harm, ought not to establish the
jurisdiction of the planning authority over the proposed use of land by another
individual.  On the other hand, it has been argued that to deny such objectors a
voice in the planning process would undermine confidence in the planning
system, discourage participation in the planning process and under-value public
opinion. The solution to this is therefore to distinguish between considerations
that are "material" for the purposes of s.55 (development) from those relevant
to s.70 (planning merits).   Only harm that is empirically identifiable could be
relevant to the question of whether development has occurred. Where planning
merits are at issue (i.e. once development had been established) public concern
manifested in perceptions of harm should be admissible to the decision-making
process as a material consideration, but they should not be decisive since expert
decision makers should be entitled to make judgments about the worth of
particular preferences.
This proposal offers a restricted view of the utilitarian model because it
demands in certain cases that protection be accorded to the minority or the
individual even if there is a plausible claim that a greater number will somehow
benefit if the individual's  desire is frustrated.  It raises a somewhat more robust
threshold against state interference  in private life via the concept of
development, so as to provide the greater emphasis upon individual interests
that the European Convention on Human Rights seems to require.  The
emphasis upon identifying a "pressing social need" and the doctrine of
proportionality in  human rights jurisprudence would appear to demand that a
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clearer  public interest be identified for the use of planning, in particular in
some cases concerning the home.   The action taken to further the legitimate
aim of protecting the rights of others must also be proportionate and achieve a
fair balance between the community interest and the protection of  the
fundamental rights of the individual.61
Category 4-  Harm to Public Policy
In the fourth category of off-site harm  the local planning authority is concerned
with an activity that conflicts with its previously established formal
development plan policies. There is a stronger case for the intervention of the
state where it does so to defend policies that are the result of a process of
consultation and debate within the community;  the purpose of these policies is
precisely to identify "pressing social needs".  This is arguably  the basis upon
which decisions such as  Richmond are founded. In other words,  the
conclusions of a democratically elected and accountable  body enshrined in its
planning policies are perhaps more genuinely seen as an expression of the
general welfare than ad hoc interventions that favour one individual or group at
the expense of others. Provided the action taken to implement them is
proportionate the local planning authority would seem to act lawfully.   Public
participation in development plan policies rescues this version of
communitarianism from authoritarianism since it is not the planning expert
alone who decides which individuals should endure a loss of freedom.
Conclusion
The recent evolution of the concept of development is firmly rooted in a
communitarian conception of planning law.   It has, however, been argued that
the uncritical broadening of the legal concept of material harm, and its use in
determining whether development has occurred, has resulted in a system that
legitimates considerable intrusion into private life.  The particular problem is
that the adverse reaction of neighbours can both establish that a change of use
is a material change and provide an overriding case for enforcement action.
                                                          
61  ISKCON v. UK, supra, at p. 144.
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These principles of domestic law seem inadequate to meet the demands of the
European Convention on Human Rights which requires that a fair balance be
achieved between the interest of the community and that of the individual.
Although the state has a relatively wide margin of appreciation there remains
the "pressing need" to justify interference in Convention Rights.  It has been
argued that this need is unlikely to be established  where the only argument for
interference (ie a finding that development occurred)  is the disapproval of
others articulated through empirically unsubstantiated conceptions of harm.
Accordingly the categories suggested above urge a more structured approach to
the relevance of off-site consequences. In particular, it has been argued that the
concept of materiality ought to be reformed in a way that recognises that only
empirically identifiable harm and not mere disapproval satisfies the concept of
development for the purpose of s.55 of the Town and Country Planning Act
1990.   The views of members of the public on planning matters should,
however, remain relevant considerations at the merits stage, but it has been
doubted whether these views should be overriding.
